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PRIVACY IN CONNECTICUT 
Arthur E. Sutherland* 
O CCASIONALLY a judgment of our Supreme Court, delivered in a superficially petty case, suddenly before our startled eyes 
displays fundamentals of our constitutional theor:y. Thus, in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,1 holding unconstitutional an 1879 Connecticut 
statute forbidding all persons to use contraceptive devices, the Court 
found it necessary to discover a "right of privacy" latent in the 
Bill of Rights and incorporated into the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. The outcome of the case is satisfying; all 
nine Justices joined in saying, in one way or another, that Connec-
ticut's statute was nonsense. I am happy to see this limit on public 
intrusion into private affairs. But the dramatic traits of the case were 
the necessity felt by five Justices for some comfortingly specific rule 
in the Constitution which would outlaw Connecticut's statute, and 
their choice of a "right of privacy" as such a rule. These are five 
wise and thoughtful judges; one is struck by their sense that they 
must explain their decision by discovering some pre-existing rule, 
more definite than "due process" with its vague contours. 
From time to time the American intellectual, like all human 
beings, changes his ideas as to the ideal balance of power in govern-
ment. Between about 1920 and 1940, wise men at Faculty Club tables 
and in New Republic editorials viewed the federal judiciary with 
dismay. Throughout this period, the typical academician was a 
man deeply imbued with faith in majorities. He was certain that 
all men were inherently good and wise, and that if it were not for 
the evil machinations of a series of tyrannies, democratic processes 
would long since have made the world a pleasant place in which to 
live. There was always some person or organization that was blamed 
for the non-arrival of Eden: Attorney General Mitchell Palmer, big 
business, Wall Street, munitions-makers, and, recurrently of course, 
the Supreme Court of the United States. At that time we felt that 
if only we could strike off the shackles imposed on majorities by 
such bad people, mankind, born free but in many places in chains, 
would again rule itself benignly, and we should all be quite happy. 
Between 1938 and 1948, a change of political theory developed 
in the intellectual life of the United States, a change so profound 
that men even now hesitate to see it plainly. Some thinkers during 
• Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard University.-Ed. 
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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that sad decade were revising their evaluation of majoritarian 
institutions; things done in Germany, Italy, and Russia, as well as 
certain activity in the United States, had unsettled previous premises 
of democratic political thinking. Hitler's popularity among the 
German people, public support of the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee and the McCarthy hearings, ancient racial wrongs, recurring 
state censorship statutes attempting to suppress books which might 
disturb the social and political ideas of the young-all these brought 
about a certain amount of revisionism in our ideas about the 
Supreme Court. ,Ever since 1905 we academics had poked fun at Mr. 
Justice Peckham for asking with dismay, "are we all ... at the mercy 
of legislative majorities?"2 In the 1950's these jests of ours came to 
seem a little less droll than they had a half-century earlier. In 1952 
Professor Rostow of the Yale Law School stated our revised credo 
when he published his distinguished essay, "The Democratic Charac-
ter of Judicial Review."3 Upon some of us who had been votaries 
of unreviewed majoritarianism, there had suddenly burst fearful 
demonstrations that unrestricted majorities could be as tyrannical 
as wicked oligarchs. Maybe Peckham's views were not so absurd 
after alll 
This revolution in concepts left us with explanations to make. 
We still had to sacrifice to the old gods, as men always must. We 
could not say in so many words that democratic societies should 
be permitted to produce cruelty, injustice, and stupidity simply 
because these are traits occasionally exhibited by all mankind. We 
could not say in plain terms that occasionally we have to select wise 
and able people and give them the constitutional function of coun-
tering the democratic process, at least for a time, until a sober second 
thought can correct a first thought which had opposite characteristics. 
To avoid the open challenge to our political faiths involved in 
appealing from the many to the Nine in order to correct the injus-
tice of the majority, we have sought from time to time to reassure 
ourselves by repeating the comforting statement that the Supreme 
Court does not simply say that this or that state or federal measure 
is so cruel or outrageous that it clashes with an undefinable, but 
nevertheless effective, constitutional negation of cruelty or outrage. 
We feel obliged to maintain our abiding democratic orthodoxy by 
· telling ourselves that if we really try hard enough we can rediscover 
a pre-existing set of hard and fast rules instituted long ago by 
majority vote of our ancestors, which the Supreme Court has only 
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
3. 66 IIARv. L. REv. 193 (1952), 
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to read and apply and which will nullify the outrageous state or 
federal prescription. 
This tension between t~ditional statements of democratic policy 
and realism of present-day perceptions emerged in 1947 and 1952 
in a classic dialogue between Justices Black and Frankfurter.4 Mr. 
Justice Black, seeking to document the existence of certain funda-
mental rights which must not be violated by the states, found the 
requisite specifics in the first eight amendments, which he felt were 
"incorporated" in the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, although dissatisfied with the position of Mr. Justice Black, 
could find no substitute adequate to explain the revisory function 
of the Supreme Court. Indeed, :M;r. Justice Frankfurter could not 
bring himself to say, in so many words, that the Court was perform-
ing a necessary, albeit anti-democratic, function. In Rochin v. 
California5 he stoutly affirmed: 
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not 
leave judges at large. We may not draw on our merely personal 
and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges 
in their judicial function. Even though the concept of due 
process of law is not final and fixed, these limits are derived 
from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our 
judicial process. . .. These are considerations deeply rooted in 
reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.6 
The trouble is that Mr. Justice Frankfurter still left us as much at 
large as we were with mere "due process of law" or with Coke's 
"common right and reason" in Doctor Bonham's Case.1 
Griswold v. Connecticut is the most recent demonstration of this 
tension between the necessity for majoritarianism and the aspiration 
to an undefinable "justice" in government. The extraordinary thing 
about this case is not its result, but rather the divergencies in the 
theories of the Justices who wrote the opinions to explain it. Every 
newspaper reader now knows that the two Connecticut statutes in 
question provided a fine or imprisonment for the use of any drug 
or instrument fo~ the purpose of preventing conception, and 
directed punishment of any person who counseled or assisted 
another in the use of contraceptive devices, as if he were himself the 
principal offender. The Connecticut court convicted and fined the 
4. This debate appeared in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), and Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
5. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
6. Id. at 169-71. See CARDOZO, THE PAlWloXES OF LEGAL SCIE.NCE (1928); CARDOZO, 
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
7. 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 113b (1610). 
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Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connec-
ticut and a cooperating physician for giving information about 
contraception to married persons. Seven of the nine United States 
Supreme Court Justices found this state action unconstitutional for 
a diversity of reasons. The other two, Justices Stewart and Black, 
expressed the view that this was "an uncommonly silly law ... ob-
viously unenforceable, except in the oblique context of the present 
case."8 Nevertheless, after examining the first, third, fourth, fifth, 
and ninth amendments, which were relied upon by the various 
prevailing opinions, the two dissenters found nothing which would 
invalidate a law proscribing contraceptives. Similarly, they found 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to be insuffi-
ciently explicit to satisfy our aspiration to leave repeal of legislation 
to legislators. 
The opinion of the Court expressed the views of only five Justices 
-Douglas, Clark, Goldberg, Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren-
and the last three felt obliged to add some further views in a separate 
concurring opinion. Justices Harlan and White did not accept the 
opinion of the Court, although both agreed that the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
The Court's five-Justice opinion found in the fourteenth amend-
ment certain latent guarantees "penumbral" to the specifics of the Bill 
of Rights; these penumbra! guarantees include "privacy and repose,'' 
which were regarded as specific enough to justify the finding of 
unconstitutionality. The Court's reasoning ran something like this: 
The fourteenth amendment forbids certain matters which are speci-
fied in the first eight amendments. These specifications of the first 
eight amendments are of two classes-explicit and "penumbra!"; in 
the latter category is a "right of privacy," not mentioned by name 
in the Constitution, but still an identified and established right. The 
Court is therefore finding the law, not making it according to its 
own predispositions, and it is not sitting "as a super-legislature to 
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch eco-
nomic problems, business affairs, or social conditions."0 
To this day, no one knows precisely what the words "due process 
of law" meant to the draftsmen of the fifth amendment, and no one 
knows what these words meant to the draftsmen of the fourteenth 
amendment, or to the many other men who took part in the ratifica-
tion of either of these provisions. However, the subjective reactions 
8. 381 U.S. at 527. 
9. Id. at 482. 
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of long-dead constitution-makers are not now significant. What is 
important is the use which the Supreme Court has made of these 
words. A common element runs through the several judgments of 
constitutional invalidity of state action in which states were found 
to have extorted a confession by long and wearying questions; 
obtained a confession by fraud; pumped out a man's stomach against 
his will to provide evidence against him; exposed a school child to 
schoolroom prayers unwelcome to the child or his parents; censored 
motion pictures on religious grounds; put a lecturer at a state univer-
sity in jail until he explained his lectures to the state attorney 
general; used race as a criterion by which to separate people in 
public schools even when the education is as good, in objective 
quality, for one race as it is for another; denied parents the privilege 
of sending their children to a private rather than a public school; 
ransacked a doctor's office to find a list of his patients; searched a 
woman's house and found indecent pictures in a trunk; or punished 
a physician who gave advice to a husband and wife on how to avoid 
having unwanted children. The common element is a sense of outrage 
produced by official pressure on an individual; in the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court, such pressure produces no good social result 
and produces undue hardship on the oppressed individual. But is 
"outraging the Supreme Court's serise of justice" any more definite 
than "denying due process of law?" 
The unspecific quality of this statement of the common element 
in all these situations raises the question of the Supreme Court's 
sitting "as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and 
propriety of laws." However, it was precisely this characterization of 
its function which the Court's Griswold opinion disclaimed. Not 
every state measure that arouses a sense of outrage in the minds of 
some people is unconstitutional; such a rule would render most state 
legislation invalid. In describing the early nineteenth century con-
cept of the relationship between federal and state power, Mr. Justice 
Holmes once stated: 
In those days it was not recognized as it is today that most of 
the distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If the States 
had any power it was assumed that they had all power, and that 
the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether.10 
Thus, whereas a great outrage perpetrated by a state violates the due 
10. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (dis-
senting opinion). Mr. Justice Holmes was commenting on Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's 
statement in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 164: (1819), that "the 
power to tax involves the power to destroy." 
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a small outrage does 
not, and the Supreme Court of the United States decides when a 
little becomes too much. Since the difference between too-much and 
not:too-much is no more definite than the difference between the 
just and the unjust, pursuit of synonyms for "injustice" is elusive. 
Shall we then denounce this judicial power? If anyone rebels at the 
thought of entrusting this power to the nine Justices, he may well 
consider for a little while to whom he would prefer to entrust it; 
this can be a sobering experience. 
Obviously, some "right of privacy" ought to be guaranteed by 
the due process clauses. A sensible and rather common modern regu-
lation requires a medical certificate as a precondition to the issuance 
of a marriage license; but I assume that if some state should require 
that the necessary medical examination be conducted in public view, 
no Justice of the Supreme Court would be found to declare this 
senseless requirement constitutional. The Court might explain this as 
a violation of "a right of privacy," but just as good an explanation is 
the outrage perpetrated on the citizen with no compensating benefit. 
The Supreme Court has recently been subjected to a great deal 
of criticism on all sides. Understandably, the Court seeks in its 
opinio~s to justify its action by conformity to a tradition of conti-
nuity and reliance upon matters already adjudicated. The Supreme 
Court was dearly right in the Griswold result, but there is food for 
thought in the five Justices' feeling that they had to search for an iden-
tifiable, traditional "right of privacy" to justify thi.s decision. Their 
explanation demonstrates an uneasy sense that a canon of unreason-
ableness or of injustice is inconsistent with the majoritarian dogma 
underlying our Constitution and with the tradition that our judges 
do not make the law, but rather find it all written for them. For this 
reason, we must continue to pursue the elusive adjective describing 
that which is constitutionally intolerable. I wish this necessity were 
not present and that we might, like Justices Harlan and White, rely 
simply on the idea that such a statute as that in Griswold is inconsis-
. tent with the undefinable concept of reasonable liberty, which due 
process of law has come to connote for us and which we must let our 
nine Justices apply. For this, we must avow when we are frank with 
ourselves, is our constitutional system. 
